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Fired by Liars: Due Process Implications in the Recent Changes
to North Carolina's Public Disclosure Laws*
INTRODUCTION
In July of 2010, the North Carolina General Assembly passed the
Government Ethics and Campaign Reform Act of 2010.' Among its
various changes to existing ethics and open records laws, the Act for
the first time opened records of disciplinary action against public
employees to public scrutiny. While the General Assembly's effort to
increase transparency among public employees is commendable,
some unintended consequences are likely to result from the
relaxation of North Carolina's previously strict public disclosure laws.
The new laws affect all state, county, and municipal entities, many of
which are ill-equipped to provide their employees with the necessary
protections to ensure that the disclosure of disciplinary action does
not violate those employees' due process rights. Further, the changes
leave open several questions that will not be answered until they are
litigated in the courts, creating an additional burden on already cash-
strapped public entities.
Imagine the following hypothetical scenario: Frank Johnson, a
probationary officer in the Chapel Hill Police Department, is
frequently the sole arresting officer of narcotics suspects who later
claim at booking to be missing large amounts of cash that they
contend they possessed when arrested. The department undertakes a
brief internal investigation which confirms the allegations against
Officer Johnson. The chief of police calls Johnson into his office the
day after the investigation and hands him a memorandum stating that
his employment with the Chapel Hill Police Department is
terminated, effective immediately, for ethical indiscretions involving
evidence. Johnson protests that he has no idea why the money was
missing in any of the arrests and that the suspects are lying, but the
chief will hear none of it. After Johnson leaves the office, the chief
* C 2011 Morgan Eugene Stewart.
1. Government Ethics and Campaign Reform Act of 2010, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 638
(codified in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT.). Governor Beverly Perdue signed the
Act into law in August 2010. Id. at 665.
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places a copy of the memorandum in Johnson's department personnel
file.
In subsequent months, Johnson interviews for jobs at the
Hillsborough, Durham, and Pittsboro police departments and
receives rejections from all three. An otherwise outstanding
candidate, Johnson has no idea why departments with vacancies
would reject his application. He wonders if the other departments
have seen the memorandum and decided not to hire him based on its
contents.
Incensed, Johnson brings suit against the Chapel Hill Police
Department and the police chief claiming they violated his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by not giving him a name-
clearing hearing to confront the false allegations of theft against him.2
He asserts that the memo may be seen by future employers, which
would negatively affect his future employment opportunities. The
court rules he has a due process liberty interest in his good name and
future employment opportunities that the town cannot infringe by
spreading false information about him. However, the court holds that
he must plead that the false information will "likely" be seen by
potential employers, not that it merely "may" be seen by them, in
order to establish his due process injury. Pleading "likely"
dissemination of false information is more difficult than simply
pleading that potential employers "may" see the information. The
Fourth Circuit uses the higher "likely" dissemination standard, but
does not require a showing that the information was actually seen by a
potential employer, as do some other circuits.'
The hypothetical facts above mirror the facts of Sciolino v. City
ofNewport News,4 except that this fictional case takes place in Chapel
Hill, North Carolina rather than Newport News, Virginia. In Sciolino,
Virginia's restrictive open records statute governing dissemination of
records of disciplinary action against public employees made it
extremely difficult for the officer in question, Sciolino, to show that
the allegedly false record in his file would "likely" be seen by future
employers.' The Virginia statute exempts from public disclosure
"[p]ersonnel records containing information concerning identifiable
2. Plaintiffs tend to bring these suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows relief for
those who suffer a deprivation of rights as a result of state action. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
3. The differing circuit courts' standards are discussed infra Part II.
4. 480 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 2007).
5. Id. at 645; see Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act, VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3801 to -3809 (2008).
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individuals."' While there is a process in Virginia whereby police
departments may share personnel files, the likelihood of
dissemination in Sciolino was arguably low because the dissemination
would be "unnecessary to accomplish any proper purpose" as
required under Virginia privacy laws.'
By comparison, until October 1, 2010, the North Carolina statute
governing public access to records of disciplinary action similarly
restricted the amount and type of information that could be made
available in such a situation.' However, after the passage of the
Government Ethics and Campaign Reform Act of 2010, a significant
change in due process implications is now underway in North
Carolina.' Frank Johnson, in the example above, could now plead
"likely" dissemination, opening not just every municipality in the
statelo to budget-busting administrative hearings and due process
lawsuits," but all public employers, including state agencies,12 boards
of education," community colleges,14 area authorities," county
governments,16 and water and sewer authorities."
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.1(1) (2008).
7. Brief of Appellees at 20, Sciolino, 480 F.3d 642 (No. 05-2229), 2006 WL 297238 at
*20 (quoting Hinderliter v. Humphries, 297 S.E.2d 684, 689-90 (Va. 1982)). Prior to
Sciolino, this issue was unsettled in the Fourth Circuit, so this change is also a relatively
recent development. See Sciolino, 480 F.3d at 650.
8. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-168(b) (2009), amended byN.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-168(b) (Supp. 2010) (requiring disclosure of the "date of the most recent
promotion, demotion, transfer, suspension, separation, or other change in position
classification").
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-23(a)(1l) (Supp. 2010). The statute requires disclosure of
the "[d]ate and type of each dismissal, suspension, or demotion for disciplinary reasons
taken by the [municipality]. If the disciplinary action was a dismissal, a copy of the written
notice of the final decision of the [municipality] setting forth the specific acts or omissions
that are the basis of the dismissal" must be disclosed. Id.
10. § 160A-168(b)(ll) (Supp. 2010).
11. See Brief of Int'l Mun. Lawyers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 8-12, City of Newport News v. Sciolino, 552 U.S. 1076 (2007) (No. 07-159),
2007 WL 3353427 at *8-12 (arguing that the "likely" dissemination standard will result in
substantial additional costs to public entities by requiring administrative hearings and the
defense of due process suits). Lawsuits for due process violations under § 1983 seek to
compensate victims under a tort theory of compensation, which makes it possible to
recover damages for loss of wages, loss of future earning capacity, emotional anguish and
distress, loss of reputation, personal humiliation, and other compensatory damages in
addition to litigation costs. Memphis Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986).
12. § 126-23(a)(ll) (Supp. 2010).
13. § 115C-320(a)(l l) (Supp. 2010).
14. § Il5D-28(a)(ll) (Supp. 2010).
t5. § 122C-158(b)(l l) (Supp. 2010).
16. § 153A-98(b)(11) (Supp. 2010).
17. § 162A-6.1(b)(l 1) (Supp. 2010).
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The convergence of the recent changes to North Carolina's open
records laws with the Fourth Circuit's standard for deprivation of a
liberty interest in employment reputation signals a major shift in due
process cases brought by public employees who have been subject to
disciplinary action. A case like Officer Sciolino's-or Officer
Johnson's-may not be particularly common, but the changes reach
far beyond police departments to many more state and local entities.
Further, the changes will likely give rise to litigation on several fronts
if the legislature does not enact clarifying amendments. While the
General Assembly continues to introduce legislation that further
opens public employee personnel records to public inspection'-
including a proposed constitutional amendment in support of a
general policy of open access known as the "Sunshine Act" or
"Sunshine Amendment"l 9-it does not seem to recognize that its rush
toward "sunshine" may be opening public entities to increased
liability. In the current economic climate, state and local government
entities cannot afford to settle or engage in litigation on these various
newly opened fronts.
Part I of this Recent Development describes the recent changes
to North Carolina's public disclosure laws concerning dissemination
of information about public employee disciplinary actions. Part II
reviews the history of the due process liberty interest in potential
future employment and the circuit split over what state employer
activity rises to a due process violation. In Part III, this Recent
Development examines the recent changes to the law in light of the
Fourth Circuit's "likely" dissemination standard and identify
ambiguities that the General Assembly should address in
amendments to the legislation. Finally, Part IV proposes some
18. H.B. 685, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011), available athttp://www.ncleg
.net/Sessions/2011/Bills/House/PDF/H685vl.pdf; S.B. 344, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2011), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/Bills/Senate/PDF/S344v1.pdf.
The bills are virtually identical and both eliminate the requirement for disclosure of the
"[dlate and type of each dismissal, suspension, or demotion for disciplinary reasons taken
by the department, agency, institution, commission, or bureau." H.B. 685 § 1; S.B. 344 § 1.
However, the bills also include a new provision requiring disclosure of "[t]he performance
of the employee, to the extent that the agency has performance records in its possession."
H.B. 685 § 1; S.B. 344 § 1. Disclosure of performance records could create further
problems with respect to the public disclosure of false information, but it is premature to
discuss the consequences of this pending legislation at the time of publication of this
Recent Development.
19. H.B. 87, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011), available athttp://www.ncga
.state.nc.us/Sessions/2011/Bills/House/PDF/H87v5.pdf; S.B. 67, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2011), available athttp://www.ncga.state.nc.us/sessions/2011 /bills/senate/pdf
/s67vl.pdf.
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amending language that would help ensure the General Assembly is
clearly articulating its policy of openness while erring on the side of
protecting employee due process rights.
I. CHANGES IN NORTH CAROLINA'S DISCLOSURE LAWS
The personnel privacy statutes amended in the Government
Ethics and Campaign Reform Act are actually exceptions to the
generally permissive policy of disclosure set out in the Public Records
Act,20 which governs access to public records in North Carolina. The
Public Records Act provides a wide-ranging definition of what
constitutes a "public record."2 1 Even though North Carolina courts
have never precisely defined "public record," they generally give the
statutes a broad reading.22 Further, public entities must permit
inspection of public records and provide copying upon payment of a
minimal fee.23 The exceptions carved out in the personnel privacy
statutes govern access to employee personnel records regardless of
whether the Public Records Act would ordinarily allow disclosure.2 4 If
a document falls under the ambit of the exceptions governing public
entities, then the disclosure of the document is "not governed by ...
the Public Records Act."" Therefore, this Recent Development does
20. SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -10 (2009) (comprising the North Carolina Public
Records Act).
21. See § 132-1(a). Records are anything "made or received pursuant to law or
ordinance in connection with the transaction of public business by any agency of North
Carolina government or its subdivisions." Id. The word "agency" includes "every public
office, public officer or official (State or local, elected or appointed), institution, board,
commission, bureau, council, department, authority or other unit of government of the
State or of any county, unit, special district or other political subdivision of government."
Id.
22. DAVID M. LAWRENCE, PUBLIC RECORDS LAW FOR NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 11 (2010); see also News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465,
481, 412 S.E.2d 7, 16 (1992) (indicating that unless falling under a specific exception,
public records, including the meeting minutes of deliberative bodies, must be disclosed).
23. § 132-6(a).
24. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-168(a) (Supp. 2010) ("Notwithstanding the
provisions of G.S. 132-6or any other general law or local act concerning access to public
records, personnel files of employees, former employees, or applicants for employment
maintained by a city are subject to inspection and may be disclosed only asprovided by this
section.") (emphasis added). The Act repeats this or similar language with regard to all
public entities affected by the recent statutory changes. Language identical to that in
section 160A-168(a) has been interpreted by North Carolina courts as an exception to the
Public Records Act. See Knight Publ'g Co. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 172
N.C. App. 486, 490, 616 S.E.2d 602, 605 (2005) (holding that identical language in another
statute "clearly and unambiguously limits what and when information . .. can be disclosed
publicly, notwithstanding the Public Records Act").
25. News Reporter Co. v. Columbus Cnty., 184 N.C. App. 512, 515, 646 S.E.2d 390,
393 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not examine the Public Records Act under Chapter 132, but
addresses only the scattered statutes recently amended by the
General Assembly codified in the chapters governing public entities.
Before the passage of the Government Ethics and Campaign
Reform Act, North Carolina's personnel records statutes only
required disclosure of the "date of the most recent promotion,
demotion, transfer, suspension, separation or other change in position
classification." 26 The meaning of this phrase has been the subject of
much speculation, but the appellate courts have never ruled on
whether the information required is merely the date of the action, or
instead includes the nature of the action as well.27 Generally, the
literal language indicates that only the date of the action need be
disclosed, but the practice of many government entities has been to
include the nature of the action as well.28 In fact, a judge in New
Hanover County Superior Court has ordered the nature of the action
to be disclosed in some situations. 29
Under the old statutes, records of disciplinary action against
public employees other than the date and, occasionally, the nature of
the action could only be released to potential future employers under
particular circumstances: after employee consent or the clearing of
procedural hurdles.30 Accordingly, it was almost certainly not "likely"
that potential employers could access information in a discharged
public employee's personnel record that might negatively affect the
employee's employment prospects. In the hypothetical case above,
even if Officer Johnson did not receive adequate opportunity to
refute the charges of theft against him in a disciplinary hearing, he
would have a difficult time showing under the old statutes that
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-168(b) (2009), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-
168(b) (Supp. 2010).
27. Robert Joyce, Disclosing Employee Discipline, COATES' CANONS: NC LOc.
GOv'T L. BLOG (Sept. 10, 2009, 11:12 AM), http://sogweb.sog.unc.edu/blogs/localgovt/?p
=684.
28. See LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 164-65.
29. See Lakeland Ledger Publ'g Corp. v. City of Wilmington, No. 03CVS2482, 2003
WL 23221345, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2003) ("N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-168(b) is
properly interpreted to require disclosure of a city employee's most recent promotion,
demotion, transfer, suspension, separation, or other change in position classification,
together with the date of such action."); see also Joyce, supra note 27 (describing another
New Hanover County Superior Court case from 2009).
30. LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 175-76 (referring to existing statutes prior to the
passage of the Government Ethics and Campaign Reform Act). Under the old law, the
employee could waive her right to confidentiality, the government agency could release
the information if necessary for the proper functioning of a requesting government
agency, or, if the requesting entity was private, the chief administrator or governing board
could release the information as long as it complied with the statute. Id.
2011] 2233
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potential employers would be "likely" to see the memorandum of
discharge in his employment file. Absent the procedural, judicial, or
consensual exceptions described above, the most information that
could be disseminated would be the date and nature of change in
employment status, not the reason for that change in status or any
details surrounding the discharge.
The recent changes to the law of public disclosure of disciplinary
actions against public employees considerably increase the amount of
information that is potentially available through information
requests.3 1 The General Assembly clarified the relevant language to
explicitly require disclosure of both the date and type of disciplinary
action.32 In addition, in the event of a dismissal, "a copy of the written
notice of the final decision," detailing the basis for the dismissal, must
be disclosed." With so much more information available, it is much
more "likely" that unfavorable details that will affect future
employment opportunities will be released. As a result, it will be
easier for litigants to meet the Fourth Circuit's pleading standard and
bring due process actions against public entities.34
II. THE LINEAGE AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: ROTH, BISHOP, AND THE
LIBERTY INTEREST IN FUTURE EMPLOYMENT
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that states will not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law."35 The Supreme Court first entertained the concept of an
occupational component to the liberty interest embodied in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments in 1923 in Meyer v. State ofNebraska.6
Then, in 1971, the Supreme Court ruled that "[w]here a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard
are essential." 7 The Court elaborated on this principle in Board of
31. Dan Kane, N.C Ethics Reform Law Signed, Opening State Workers' Records,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 3, 2010, at IA. For a discussion of the amount
and type of information that the government must disclose, see infra Part III.
32. Government Ethics and Campaign Reform Act of 2010, § 18(a), 2010 N.C. Sess.
Laws 638, 654 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-23(a)(ll) (Supp. 2010)) (requiring the
disclosure of the "[d]ate and type of each dismissal, suspension, or demotion for
disciplinary reasons").
33. Id.
34. Of course, whether a given action would succeed or fail under the new statutes
remains to be seen. Therefore, this Recent Development does not speculate as to the
merits of any particular due process claim.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
37. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
2234 [Vol. 89
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Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,38 writing that if the State imposes a
stigma or disability, such as a badge of dishonesty, upon an employee
that affects her ability to take other employment, then the employee
must have an opportunity to refute the charges. 39 This opportunity to
be heard generally provides adequate process for the State to be able
to burden the employee with disclosure of the details of dismissal.
Four years later, the Court in Bishop v. Wood"o again intimated
that a violation of the liberty interest could occur if the stigmatizing
information were made public.41 The Court explained, however, that
since the "Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a
guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions,"42 a
person's liberty interest is not violated, even if the reasons given for
discharge were false, unless the reasons are publicly disclosed.43 In
essence, the litigation theory operates something like a
constitutionally-rooted defamation claim in that the State may not
stigmatize an employee by publicly distributing false information
about her.44
The public disclosure requirement in Bishop triggered a three-
way split among the circuits as to when information has been "made
public." 45 The First and Seventh Circuits adhere to an "actual
38. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
39. Id. at 573-74. The Roth court ultimately held that the State did not violate Roth's
liberty interest because its failure to renew his contract did not stigmatize him in such a
way that would affect his future employment opportunities. Id. at 574-75.
40. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
41. CE id. at 348 ("Since the former communication was not made public, it cannot
properly form the basis for a claim that petitioner's interest in his 'good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity' was thereby impaired.").
42. Id. at 350.
43. Id. at 348-49.
44. J. MICHAEL MCGUINNESS, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS (2007),
reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at VII-15 (N.C. Bar Ass'n Found., 2007); Katherine Crytzer,
Comment, You're Fired! Bishop v. Wood: When Does a Letter in a Former Public
Employee ' Personnel File Deny A Due Process Liberty Right?, 16 GEO. MA SON L. REV.
447, 462 (2009). Actual tort defamation claims would be impeded by North Carolina law,
which grants immunity to employers who disclose job history information to potential
employers. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.12 (2009). However, section 1-539.12 does not
affect the operation of the personnel privacy statutes addressed here and does not afford
protection for employers who violate Due Process rights. See LAWRENCE, supra note 22,
at 176. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has articulated that "the constitutional harm 'is not the
defamation' itself; rather it is 'the denial of a hearing at which the dismissed employee has
an opportunity to refute the public charge.'" Sciolino v. City of Newport News, 480 F.3d
642, 649 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cox v. N. Va. Transp. Comm'n, 551 F.2d 555, 558 (4th
Cir. 1976)).
45. See Bishop, 426 U.S. at 348. While some commentators argue that an "actual
publication" standard is the correct interpretation of the holding in Bishop, others argue
2011] 2235
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publication" standard whereby the plaintiff must show that a
potential employer either requested the stigmatizing information or
that the previous employer divulged the stigmatizing information.4 6
This standard is the most stringent because it forces the plaintiff to
prove actual injury-a burden the Fourth Circuit is unwilling to place
on plaintiffs because "the information would have already been
communicated to a potential employer, the employee's job
opportunities foreclosed, and his reputation damaged before any
possibility for a name-clearing hearing."47
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits use the lenient "presence" or
"possibility" standard.48 The Fourth Circuit refuses to apply this
standard due to concern that communication between employer and
employee might be inhibited if the mere presence of information in a
personnel file or the slightest possibility of its dissemination will result
in a constitutional cause of action.49
The intermediate standard, adopted by the Second, Fourth, and
Fifth Circuits, attempts to strike a balance between the harsh results
that can occur from application of the "actual" or "presence"
dissemination standards. The Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have
held that the plaintiff must show a "likelihood" that the stigmatizing
information will be disseminated to potential employers.so The Fourth
that a "likely" dissemination standard is correct. Compare Crytzer, supra note 44, at 448-
49 (arguing that the "actual publication" standard is more accurate and more easily
justiciable), with Jenny S. Brannan, Comment, The Publication Debate in Deprivation of
Occupational Liberty Claihs, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 171, 183-85 (1998) (arguing for the
adoption of a "likely" standard as a compromise between the "actual publication"
standard and the "presence" standard).
46. See, e.g., Burton v. Town of Littleton, 426 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[T]he
stigmatizing statements or charges must have been intentionally publicized by the
government."); Johnson v. Martin, 943 F.2d 15, 16-17 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[P]otentially
stigmatizing information which remains in a discharged employee's personnel file and has
not been disseminated beyond the proper chain of command within the police department
had not been made public.").
47. Sciolino, 480 F.3d at 649-50.
48. See, e.g., Buxton v. City of Plant City, 871 F.2d 1037, 1045-46 (11th Cir. 1989)
("[T]he presence of stigmatizing information placed into the public record by a state
entity, pursuant to a state statute or otherwise, constitutes sufficient publication to
implicate the liberty interest .... "); Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567, 580 n.18 (10th Cir. 1985)
(agreeing with the idea that "the presence of false and defamatory information in an
employee's personnel file may constitute 'publication' if not restricted for internal use").
49. Sciolino, 480 F.3d at 649.
50. See, e.g., id. at 650; Whiting v. Univ. of S. Miss., 451 F.3d 339, 347 (5th Cir. 2006)
(requiring a showing that the government "made or is likely to make" the stigmatizing
information public (internal quotation marks omitted)); Donato v. Plainview-Old
Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1996) (ruling that the "requirement
is satisfied where the stigmatizing charges are placed in the discharged employee's
[Vol. 892236
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Circuit prefers this standard to the "actual" and "presence" standards
because it does not impose large costs on the employer or
significantly compromise public administrative procedures." The
standard ensures that the agency will be required to provide a hearing
only if it will be making available potentially false information about
the former employee.
In order to state a cause of action in the Fourth Circuit for a due
process "defamation" violation, a plaintiff must show that the claims
made by the employer "(1) placed a stigma on his reputation; (2)
were made public by the employer; (3) were made in conjunction with
his termination or demotion; and (4) were false."53 According to the
Fourth Circuit:
A plaintiff can meet this standard in two ways. First, the
employee could allege (and ultimately prove) that his former
employer has a practice of releasing personnel files to all
inquiring employers. Second, the employee could allege that
although his former employer releases personnel files only to
certain inquiring employers, that he intends to apply to at least
one of these employers. 54
Since North Carolina is in the Fourth Circuit, the "likely"
dissemination standard controls in cases concerning the release of
potentially false and stigmatizing information by public employers."
III. NEW CONSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION: NORTH
CAROLINA'S UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Under the Fourth Circuit's "likely" dissemination standard, the
recent changes to North Carolina's statutes governing the
dissemination of personnel information will probably open up a
multitude of potential constitutional challenges. How can public
personnel file and are likely to be disclosed to prospective employers" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
51. Sciolino, 480 F.3d at 650.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 646. North Carolina courts also recognize that "where a state agency
publicly and falsely accuses a discharged employee of dishonesty, immorality, or job
related misconduct, considerations of due process demand that the employee be afforded
a hearing in order to have an opportunity to refute the accusation and remove the stigma
upon his reputation." Wuchte v. McNeil, 130 N.C. App. 738, 743, 505 S.E.2d 142, 146
(1998). Plaintiffs in state courts can establish a violation of a liberty interest by showing
that a governmental entity infringed the plaintiffs "freedom to seek further employment."
Id. at 742, 505 S.E.2d at 145 (quoting Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 724, 260 S.E.2d 611,
617 (1979)).
54. Sciolino, 480 F.3d at 650.
55. Id.
2011] 2237
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entities best address the problems that may arise? The changes in the
statutes are open to several interpretations that may infringe on
public employees' due process rights, leading to litigation that could
harm the operation and budgets of state, county, and municipal
governments and agencies.
A. Has the GeneralAssembly Created a "Practice ofReleasing"
Information?
First, the statutes now make the date and type of disciplinary
action, along with "a copy of the written notice of the final decision of
the [entity] setting forth the specific acts or omissions that are the
basis of the dismissal,"" a matter of public record. Does this mean
that all public agencies now have a "practice of releasing personnel
files to all inquiring employers," as was the concern in Sciolbo,"
under the "likely" dissemination standard? The answer is not
completely clear. While actual disclosure of information merely
between individual public agencies is not enough to trigger a violation
of the liberty interest, dissemination to the wider public can result in a
violation." The amended statutes require that the information be
made available to the public, not that a particular agency share the
information with another agency. 9 Certainly, since the document is
now a public record under the law, and "[a]ny person may have
access to this information for the purpose of inspection, examination,
and copying during regular business hours,"o the change to the
statutes indicates a strong possibility that this new "practice" could be
enough to trigger constitutional causes of action that previously
would not have been possible. The North Carolina Attorney General
recognizes this as a possible consequence of the new statutes.6 1 With a
lack of case law and a prohibition on public entities bringing suit for
56. Government Ethics and Campaign Reform Act of 2010, § 18(a), 2010 N.C. Sess.
Laws 638, 654 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-23(a)(11) (Supp. 2010)).
57. Sciolino, 480 F.3d at 650.
58. See Bell v. Town of Port Royal, 586 F. Supp. 2d 498, 519 (D.S.C. 2008).
59. See §§ 18(a)-(g), 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws at 654-58 (codified as amended in scattered
sections ofN.C. GEN. STAT.).
60. § 18(d), 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws at 656-57 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-
158(b2) (Supp. 2010)).
61. N.C. DEPT. OF JUSTICE LEGAL OPS., PERSONNEL INFORMATION REQUIRED TO
BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION BY PUBLIC EMPLOYERS 5 (Nov. 8, 2010)





declaratory judgment 62 to answer this question, there is little guidance
on this issue, and it will have to be resolved through costly litigation if
legislators fail to act first.
B. WhatAboutRecords that Don'tExist?
A constitutional cause of action can arise if an employer creates
and then disseminates a document containing false and stigmatizing
information.' But if the information exists, and a document does not,
do the new changes indicate that public entities must now create the
documents? Further, if the documents did exist at one time and have
since been destroyed, it is equally unclear whether they should be
recreated.
Generally, North Carolina does not require public agencies to
create records that do not exist simply because they receive an
information request.65 Indeed, several of the statutes simply require
the public entity to "maintain a record of each of its employees"
showing the requisite information about each employee.66 Those
records are public. 6' However, other statutes state that "[t]he
following information . .. is a matter of public record."6' The focus on
the "information" as a matter of public record creates some
ambiguity about whether agencies will need to create records. 69
Furthermore, the personnel privacy statutes are outside the scope of
the Public Records Act, so the statutory protection against creation of
records does not apply in these situations.70 If the "information" is
62. McCormick v. Hanson Aggregates Se., Inc., 164 N.C. App. 459, 463, 596 S.E.2d
431, 434 (2004) (holding that allowing an agency to bring an action for declaratory
judgment to prevent disclosure circumvents the legislative intent of the Public Records
Act).
63. Frayda Bluestein, Waiting for Interpretations of the New Personnel Privacy
Provisions: What Options Do Local Governments Have?, COATES' CANONS: NC Loc.
GOv'T L. BLOG (Sept. 15, 2010, 2:23 PM), http://sogweb.sog.unc.edulblogs/localgovt/?p
=3183.
64. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 (1977) (per curiam) (stating that due process
requires a hearing "if the employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory
impression about the employee in connection with his termination").
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6.2(e) (2009) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed
to require a public agency to respond to a request for a copy of a public record by creating
or compiling a record that does not exist.").
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-320(a), 115D-28(a), 126-23(a) (Supp. 2010).
67. §§ 115C-320(a), 115D-28(a), 126-23(a) (Supp. 2010).
68. §§ 122C-158(b), 153A-98(b), 160A-168(b), 162A-6.1(b) (Supp. 2010) (emphasis
added).
69. Frayda Bluestein, Personnel Privacy Law Changes, COATES' CANONS: NC Loc.
Gov'T L. BLOG (July 14, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://sogweb.sog.unc.edu/blogs/localgovt/?p
=2798 [hereinafter Personnel PrivacyLaw Changes].
70. Id.
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public-and not necessarily just the "record"-an agency may need
to disseminate the information itself regardless of whether a record
currently exists." Presumably, the information could be in any form
and would not necessarily have to be in a document. For example,
information could also be transmitted orally or through a recording.
Indeed, in the statutes requiring the information to be disclosed, "an
employee's personnel file consists of any information in any form."72
On the other hand, courts have historically been reluctant to require
government agencies to create records where there are none.
Additionally, while there is no specificity regarding the form of the
other "information" to be disclosed, the statutes clearly contemplate
that, with respect to a dismissal, only a physical copy will be
disclosed.74
Moreover, the same questions arise regarding the disposal of
personnel records. Government agencies have their own schedules
governing the disposition of public records. 75 Certainly, if a record
should have been destroyed and was not, it would still be subject to
inspection.7 ' For example, state agencies destroy disciplinary records
five years after a final resolution unless permitted by law to destroy
them earlier. 7 If the record no longer exists, but the "information"
about the employee still exists-perhaps in a supervisor's memory, an
email, or some other less formal format-it may still be open to
dissemination. Thus, the agency may still need to transmit the
information to the requesting party, opening itself to due process
claims as a consequence.
Additionally, even if the agency creates a written notice, it still
needs a hearing procedure in place so that dismissed employees may
confront the allegations against them. An adequate hearing
proceeding includes the following: "oral or written notice of the
charges against [the employee], an explanation of the employer's
evidence, and an opportunity to present [the employee's] side of the
7 1. Id.
72. §§ 122C-158(a), 153A-98(a), 160A-168(a), 162A-6.1(a) (Supp. 2010).
73. LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 32-33.
74. See §§ 115C-320(a)(11), 115D-28(a)(11), 122C-158(b)(11), 126-23(a)(11), 153A-
98(b)(11), 160A-168(b)(11), 162A-6.1(b)(11) (Supp. 2010).
75. SeeLAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 68-69.
76. Id. at 15.
77. GOV'T RECORDS BRANCH, N.C. DEP'T OF CULTURAL RES., GENERAL




story."" Municipal and county governments and other smaller public
entities can hardly hope to provide meaningful hearing procedures
such as this without significantly cutting into their already waning
budgets.79
C. What is " Written Notice of the Final D ecision?"
The new statutes make "a copy of the written notice of the final
decision" a matter of public record. 0 By saying that "the written
notice" should be made available rather than "a written notice," the
language seems to assume that all public entities have a procedure for
creating written notices. However, this is not the case. Statutes exist
that require the production of a final written notice,82 but particularly
in the case of probationary and at-will employees, many agencies do
not create written documentation of the reasons for dismissal." The
question becomes: do the new statutes create a duty for agencies to
78. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); see also Harrell v.
City of Gastonia, 392 F. App'x 197, 204 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding that a public employee had
been provided "all of the process that is due him" when he was given a memorandum
detailing the reason for dismissal, representation at a hearing in which counsel presented
evidence and examined witnesses, and "a full opportunity to present his side of the
story"). The Supreme Court does not require a full evidentiary hearing for a public
employee to confront the charges. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46 (contrasting
Loudermill's case with a case that involved termination of welfare payments where a more
formal hearing was required). In Harrell, the court held that the memorandum was not
subject to likely dissemination to the public under the old North Carolina personnel
privacy statutes. Harrell, 392 F. App'x at 204. Harrellis another case in which the plaintiff
would almost certainly be able to meet the "likely" pleading standard due to the
amendments to the statutes, although this issue did not ultimately determine the outcome
of the case. See id. Under the new statutes, the memorandum in that case probably would
have constituted a "written notice of the final decision" and likely would have been
available to the public. See § 160A-168(b)(ll) (Supp. 2010).
79. See, e.g., Counties Grapple with Another Painful Budget Process, COUNTYLINES,
Apr. 2011, at 10, 10, available at http://www.ncacc.org/countylines/2011/04/print.pdf
(discussing the continuing budget problems facing fifteen North Carolina counties).
80. See, e.g., § 126-23(a)(l 1) (Supp. 2010) ("If the disciplinary action was a dismissal, a
copy of the written notice of the final decision of the head of the department setting forth
the specific acts or omissions that are the basis of the dismissal.").
81. See Personnel Privacy Law Changes, supra note 69 ("When not required to [do]
so, public agencies typically do not create documents specifying the reasons for dismissals,
especially of at-will employees, who may be dismissed with or without cause.").
82. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35(a) (2009) (establishing a requirement for
presenting the employee with written reasons for dismissal).
83. See Personnel Privacy Law Changes, supra note 69 ("Local governments with
policies that require termination only for cause will regularly prepare written notice of the
type called for in the new legislation for those employees to whom the policy applies. But
for employees of public agencies that are not subject to any statutory or self-imposed
requirement for notice, there simply may not be a written notice of dismissal to copy and
provide to the public .... ").
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begin creating final written notices of dismissals, even for their
probationary employees? If "the written notice" must be made
public, it may be that agencies will have to create a document because
they no longer have the option of using more informal procedures to
create "a written notice." This reading is consistent with the Attorney
General's interpretation of the language.84
Further, the statutes also require that in the event of a
promotion, the agency must disclose a "general description of the
reasons for each promotion."" By contrast, the disciplinary action
section requires disclosure of the written notice "setting forth the
specific acts or omissions that form the basis of the dismissal."86 The
General Assembly could have worded the disciplinary action section
of the statutes as it worded the promotion section if it merely had
wanted to make the general reasons for dismissal public; instead, it
specified that this particular information must be contained in a
written document." This indicates that the General Assembly worded
the statute in a way that assumes that this particular information
should be contained in a document that entities must create.
What is unclear, though, is whether the General Assembly
intended to do away with employment at-will by requiring a
disclosure of "specific acts or omissions" that led to the dismissal.
Employment at-will allows for termination without cause. The new
statutes require that a specific reason be given for the termination.
Therefore, does this mean that employment at-will no longer exists
for public employees in North Carolina?
Also, "specific acts or omissions"" is vague. Can the letter simply
say, using the earlier example, that Officer Johnson was dismissed for
"moral impropriety," or must it be more specific? Should the letter
say "theft" or "dishonesty," or should it lay out in detail the events
84. See N.C. DOJ ADVISORY OPINION, supra note 61, at 4 (interpreting "the written
notice" as the "clear intent of the legislature that public employers must now maintain for
public inspection a copy of the final dismissal letter regarding each employee dismissed for
a disciplinary reason").
85. § 126-23(a)(10) (Supp. 2010).
86. § 126-23(a)( 11) (Supp. 2010).
87. See Personnel PrivacyLaw Changes, supra note 69. However, proposed legislation
would expand this "general description" requirement to "each promotion, demotion,
transfer, suspension, separation, or other change in position classification" as well as
requiring disclosure of any "performance records" the public entity has on hand. H.B. 685,
2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § I (N.C. 2011), available athttp://www.ncleg.net/Sessions
/2011/Bills/House/PDF/H685v1.pdf; S.B. 344, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.C.
2011), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011 /Bills/Senate/PDF/S344vl.pdf. These
provisions would greatly increase the amount of information being made public.
88. § 126-23(a)(ll) (Supp. 2010).
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leading to the dismissal? Something as general as "an incident with a
citizen at 5:23 PM on October 17, 2010" could, simply by its
vagueness, allow for a claim of falsity or misrepresentation since a
description so general could imply an excessive force problem rather
than theft. The possibility that such a description may be "specific"
enough to comply with the statute underscores this problem.
Finally, when exactly does a "final decision" occur? Is it
measured at the time the agency receives the request, or when the
entire appeal process has run its course? For example, state agencies
are among the few public entities that have appeal processes that
allow dismissed employees to challenge their termination.89 If a
records request arrives after the termination decision has been made,
but before the time limit for requesting an appeal has run, is the
termination document the "final decision" even though there may be
a later, "more final" decision?90 State agency decisions on dismissals
may be appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings.9 The
administrative law judge then holds a hearing and makes a ruling that
goes back to the state agency, which makes a final decision.92 If the
agency cannot make a decision within the specified amount of time,
the administrative law judge's decision becomes the final decision.9
This is only the procedure for state agencies, and it illustrates the
wildly varied results that can occur due to the required procedures
and extensions. When dealing with municipal and county
governments, operations and hearing procedures are much less
streamlined and may not have any formal appeal proceedings at all,
making it even more difficult to determine when exactly a "final
decision" has been made.94
89. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-34 (2009) (describing the grievance procedure for
career state employees).
90. Interview with Frayda S. Bluestein, Assoc. Dean for Faculty Dev., Professor of
Pub. L. and Gov't, N.C. Sch. ofGov't, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 30, 2010).
91. § 126-34.1(a)(1).
92. § 150B-44 ("An agency . . . has 60 days from the day it receives the official record
in a contested case from the Office of Administrative Hearings or 60 days after its next
regularly scheduled meeting, whichever is longer, to make a final decision in the case. This
time limit may be extended by the parties or, for good cause shown, by the agency for an
additional period of up to 60 days.").
93. Teague v. N.C. Dept. of Transp., 177 N.C. App. 215, 220, 628 S.E.2d 395, 399
(2006).
94. See, e.g., Dan Kane, N.C. Groups Try to Curb Public Records Access,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 15, 2011, at lA, available athttp://www.charlotteobserver
.com/2011/05/15/2297749/nc-groups-try-to-curb-public-records.html (describing the
varying agreements school districts make with terminated employees regarding disclosure
of the terms of dismissal).
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Indeed, the Attorney General indicates that "[a] 'final decision'
may be one on which the highest authority in the employing agency
has passed judgment or a 'final decision' may be an action of an agent
to whom final agency decisionmaking authority has been
delegated."" This would mean that if the entity has not created a
formal written notice, any kind of written document may qualify as
"the final written notice." This is particularly relevant since, as
discussed below, the statutes probably open up existing records
created prior to October 1, 2010,6 as a record that contains any
indication by a supervisor of dismissal may constitute "the final
written notice." This may mean that a final notice could be an email
sent by a supervisor expressing displeasure with employee
performance, a post-it note left on an employee's desk to discuss a
particular problem, or any one of a number of much more informal
written modes of communication that are the "final" communications
from a supervisor of the reasons for the employee's dismissal.
D. Do the Provisions Apply Retroactively to Former Employees?
Do the new requirements reach only those records created on or
after October 1, 2010, or do they open records that were previously
closed as long as they still existed on October 1, 2010? The personnel
privacy statutes amended by the Government Ethics and Campaign
Reform Act apply to both current employees and former
employees.17 The statutes require that the public entity disclose the
required information with regard to "each employee."98 The
amendments do not specify whether the referenced "employee"
includes both current and former employees, or only applies to
current employees. Due to the absence in six of the seven of the
amended statutes99 of a provision specifically barring access to former
employees' disciplinary files, there is every indication that the
personnel privacy statutes treat current and former employee files
identically. While the statutes most likely do not require retroactive
95. N.C. DOJ ADVISORY OPINION, supra note 61, at 7-8.
96. See infra Part III.D.
97. See LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 146. The section applies to both current and
former employees, as demonstrated by the definition of "employee" or other direct
statements. Id.
98. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-320(a)(l1), 115D-28(a)(ll), 122C-158(b)(11), 126-
23(a)(l 1), 153A-98(b)(1 1), 160A-168(b)(11), 162A-6.1(b)(1 1) (Supp. 2010).
99. The state personnel privacy statute maintains the privacy of former employee
disciplinary records. SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-22(c) (2009).
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creation of nonexistent dismissal letters for former employees,o the
new amendments probably open existing, previously closed files to
public inspection.'0 ' Indeed, the changes sent many city and county
officials scrambling for an answer to this question.102
Due to the potential retroactive opening of a large number of
employee records to public inspection, this is perhaps the most
important and consequential question the new amended statutes
raise. Retroactive application could generate a barrage of due process
claims not only because of the newly available information, but also
because of what was most likely an employee's expectation of privacy
at the time of dismissal. To compound the problem, hearing
procedures will need to be available for former employees; public
entities would presumably have to provide notice to past employees
of their right to a hearing. The hearing requirement creates the
logistical problem of tracking down former employees.
The Attorney General recognizes that release of the information
would most likely trigger even a former employee's due process right
to a name-clearing hearing.o3 If the courts agree with the Attorney
General's interpretation of this provision, public entities may be on
the hook for even more administrative costs than before.
IV. PROPOSED CLARIFICATIONS
While the practice of opening records to public inspection
furthers the General Assembly's laudable goal of increasing public
trust in government, lawmakers must not overlook the due process
implications of the changes. If the General Assembly is unwittingly
opening state and local agencies and governments to a host of
potential lawsuits, it must act in order to preempt potentially
problematic judicial interpretation of the new statutes. Indeed, the
100. N.C. DOJ ADVISORY OPINION, supra note 61, at 4. Creation of dismissal letters of
former employees would lead to "absurd" results that North Carolina courts seek to avoid.
See Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 189, 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (2004).
101. N.C. DOJ ADVISORY OPINION, supra note 61, at 5 ("It is therefore our opinion
that written notices of dismissal as to each employee terminated for disciplinary reasons,
including those written prior to October 1, 2010, must now be made available for public
inspection.").
102. Nicole Cartrette, Employee Records Not So Private Anymore, NEWS REPORTER
(Whiteville, N.C.), Aug. 10, 2010, http://whiteville.com/articles/2010/08/12/news
/doc4c60093a96d5d105066209.txt (indicating several concerns and interpretations of the
North Carolina League of Municipalities, the North Carolina Association of County
Commissioners, and Columbus County officials).
103. N.C. DOJ ADVISORY OPINION, supra note 61, at 5 (suggesting that public
disclosure of the reasons for dismissal without an opportunity for a hearing may trigger a
liberty interest protected by due process).
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courts interpret all public disclosure statutes in favor of disclosure
wherever possible."
First, the General Assembly should clarify whether it intended to
create a regular practice of releasing information about disciplinary
actions against public employees to those employees' future
employers. If it wants the information to be easily available in order
to inspire public trust in the competency and moral soundness of
police officers, teachers, and other public employees, then every
public entity will need to provide a substantive hearing procedure for
disciplinary dismissals. This could be as simple as requiring public
entities to develop their own hearing procedures if they have not
already done so. Currently, there is no uniform standard or
requirement to develop hearing procedures. Of course, this would
lead to a slight increase in operating expenses, but the cost in this
regard is probably miniscule in comparison to the potential
settlements or litigation arising from due process violations.'o
Second, the statutes should state whether public entities will be
required to create public records that do not already exist. While
there is a general presumption against requiring the creation of
records under the Public Records Act, the personnel statutes fall
outside of that Act and are not necessarily subject to the same
presumption.106 In order to make this clear, the General Assembly
should amend the provision requiring disclosure of certain
"information" and state whether it refers to records containing the
information or the information itself. If the legislative intent is to
prevent agencies from having to create new records upon request, the
statutes should clarify that it is not the information itself that is
public, but rather, the existing documents containing such
information. The General Assembly should also clarify whether
"information" is referring merely to recorded information or to a
more esoteric idea of "knowledge obtained.""' Finally, it should
consider whether the effective abolishment of employment at-will was
within the contemplation of the drafters of the statutes. If the statutes
104. See News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465, 475, 412 S.E.2d 7, 13
(1992).
105. See supra note 11 for the types of damages available in a due process lawsuit.
106. Cf News Reporter Co. v. Columbus Cnty., 184 N.C. App. 512, 515, 646 S.E.2d
390, 393 (2007) ("Our Supreme Court has held that if a document falls within the scope of
[a personnel privacy statute], then it is 'not governed by N.C.G.S. § 132-6 of the Public
Records Act because [the personnel privacy statutes] provide[] such inspection and
disclosure may only be done as provided by that section.'" (quoting Elkin Tribune, Inc. v.
Yadkin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 331 N.C. 735, 736, 417 S.E.2d 465, 466 (1992))).
107. MERRIAM WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 641 (11th ed. 2003).
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require public entities to provide reasons for terminating employees,
the statutes imply that every termination is now "for cause."
Third, the statutes should indicate what an agency or government
entity should do in the event that it does not provide "written notice
of the final decision" when it terminates employees, whether
probationary, at-will, or otherwise. If the General Assembly wishes to
mandate that all entities create a written notice procedure, the
statutes should clearly state this requirement. In addition, the statutes
should provide that public entities cannot avoid liability simply by
refusing to create a written notice. If entities can circumvent the
statutes by verbally giving reasons for dismissal, the policy of
increasing government openness will be compromised.'" Also, with
regard to the "specific acts or omissions" that led to a dismissal, the
statute should specify whether the acts can be described by type, or
whether a narrative account of the situation is required. Logically, the
more specific the information required by the statutes, the better the
probability that the allegations will contain inaccurate statements.
This could further open public entities to liability. Additionally, the
statutes should delineate when exactly a final decision occurs. If
worded as the "written notice of the final available decision at the
time of the request," the statutes would more clearly direct public
entities to which documents must be released.
Finally, if the General Assembly intends the public disclosure
provisions to apply only to dismissals that occur on or after the
effective date of the Government Ethics and Campaign Reform Act,
it needs to say so clearly. While limiting disclosure to current
employees would be contrary to the policy of openness, it would solve
many potential problems that would arise if the requirements applied
retroactively. If this question reaches the courts, they will most likely
interpret the statutes in favor of openness, applying the statutes to
dismissals occurring prior to enactment, and allowing access to former
employees' files that were once confidential. 09
Therefore, if the General Assembly did not intend to open
previously confidential records to the public, it should act quickly to
amend the language. If it intends the statutes to apply to former
employees, the General Assembly must understand the serious
108. Whether oral disclosures satisfy the "likely" standard for due process violations is
a subject beyond the scope of this Recent Development.
109. The Attorney General has indicated that this interpretation is likely. See N.C.
DOJ ADVISORY OPINION, supra note 61, at 5.
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potential for frequent due process suits against public agencies and
state and local governments throughout North Carolina.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina General Assembly passed the Government
Ethics and Campaign Reform Act in order to achieve the admirable
goal of increasing the transparency of and public trust in state
government; however, these changes may have unforeseen
consequences with regard to liberty interests protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In light of the Fourth
Circuit's "likely" dissemination standard for determining a violation
of an employee's liberty interest in securing future employment and
not being falsely maligned by one's previous employer,'10 the General
Assembly should revisit some of the language in the public disclosure
laws by passing clarifying amendments regarding administrative
record creation and hearing procedures, the application of the
statutes to former employees' records, and what constitutes a "written
notice of the final decision." A few such amendments would plug
many of the holes in the new statutes, but action should be taken
quickly before due process claims begin moving through the courts
and the added administrative costs of providing notice and hearings
increase government operating expenditures. Given that North
Carolina courts will interpret ambiguities in the statutes with a
presumption in favor of disclosure,'" due process violations from
these disclosures are more "likely" than ever before.
MORGAN EUGENE STEWART
110. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
111. See News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465, 475, 412 S.E.2d 7, 13
(1992).
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